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RETHINKING TRADITIONAL CONCEPTIONS OF CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY: AN ANALYSIS OF HOW THE U.S. SUPREME 
COURT’S DECISION IN STEVENS IMPACTS THE ILLINOIS 
SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN PEOPLE V. HOLLINS
JAMES D. KONSTANTOPOULOS*
INTRODUCTION
Federal child pornography statutes criminalize the creation, distribu-
tion or possession of sexually explicit materials featuring children (a “mi-
nor”) below the age of eighteen.1 State laws determine the age of consent 
for consensual sexual relations, provided that no state statute sets an age of 
less than the federal floor of sixteen years old.2 The federal child pornogra-
phy laws, while revised in the 1980’s3, have not managed to keep up with 
the technological advances that have become all too customary to us. The 
prevalence of “smart phones” (especially the iPhone and similar Android-
based devices) and the “apps”4 available for those seeking a “hook-up”5
has caused many people, minors included, to become much more comfort-
able taking and trading sexually-explicit images of themselves. The dis-
crepancy between the two age classifications—the age at which an 
individual can consent to sex and the age at which an individual can con-
sent to being photographed in a sexually explicit manner—has recently 
become a major issue and will continue to be an issue until the seemingly 
contradictory laws can in some way be reconciled.6
* J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. I would 
like to thank Professors Douglas Godfrey and Vincent Samar for their assistance in helping me devel-
op and articulate my arguments in this paper. Finally, I would like to Illinois Supreme Court Justice 
Anne M. Burke, whose dissent in the Hollins case served as the inspiration for this paper
 1.  18 U.S.C. § 2256(1) (2008).  
 2.  U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, 18 U.S.C. § 2A3.2 (2013) (defining statutory rape as 
occurring when sexual relations are committed with a “minor under the age of sixteen years”). 
 3.  Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L.No. 98-292, § 5(a)(1), 98 Stat. 204 (1984) (which 
redefined the term “minor” to mean someone under the age of eighteen; the statute had previously 
defined a minor as someone below the age of sixteen). 
 4.  App, URBAN DICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=apps (last 
visited February 9, 2014). 
 5.  Hook-up, URBAN DICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=hook-up 
(last visited February 9, 2014). 
6. See generally Lawrence G. Walters, How to Fix the Sexting Problem: An Analysis of the 
Legal and Policy Considerations for Sexting Legislation, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 98 (2010). 
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Imagine a situation in which an adult man is dating a seventeen-year-
old girl (or vice versa7). The two begin to engage in a consensual sexual 
relationship. During the course of one of their sexual encounters, the girl 
brings up the idea of taking a few nude photographs. The man agrees and 
does so, using his iPhone (or Blackberry or Android device). The man later, 
at the request of the girl, emails the pictures to her and a parent snooping in 
his or her daughter’s email account finds the pictures. The parent goes to 
the police and the police arrest the man for taking the nude pictures, pic-
tures that the girl herself requested he take. 
The situation described above is the basic premise of People of the 
State of Illinois v. Marshall C. Hollins, a case that made it all the way up to 
the Illinois Supreme Court in 2012. Illinois statutory law currently provides 
that seventeen (17) is the age at which a person can legally consent to sex-
ual relations with another person.8 An additional eight states have statutes 
that provide for the same age of consent as in Illinois.9 Of the remaining 
forty-one jurisdictions in the union (forty states and the District of Colum-
bia), thirty-one set sixteen (16) as the age at which a minor can consent to 
sexual relations10 and the remaining eleven states set eighteen (18) as the 
age of consent.11 This patchwork of state laws dictating the age of consent, 
against the backdrop the federal law that establishes the age of majority for 
pornography, makes it difficult for an adult, someone eighteen years or 
older to know whether the behavior they are engaging in is lawful. So long 
as this patchwork of largely contradictory laws exist, no matter why some 
states have a different set age than others, it is not hard to imagine the pros-
ecution of an individual above the age of eighteen (a “non-minor”) for tak-
ing part in the memorialization of sexual relations via the taking of sexually 
explicit photographs with his or her seventeen-year-old (and in thirty-one 
states sixteen-year-old) significant other while engaged in otherwise legal 
conduct. 
The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Stevens held that 
free speech cannot be interfered with when there is no specific illegal con-
duct to which the speech is integral in the underlying act that the free 
 7.  The situation would also apply with same-sex partners, whether both participants are male or 
female. 
 8.  AGE OF CONSENT BY STATE, http://www.age-of-consent.info/ (last visited January 20, 2014). 
 9.  Id. (Colorado, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Texas, Wyoming). 
 10.  Id. (Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Mon-
tana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia). 
 11.  Id. (Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, North Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, 
Virginia, Wisconsin). 
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speech depicts. The majority did not address Stevens when deciding Hol-
lins. This Note addresses the Stevens case in the specific context of the 
criminalization of depictions of “child pornography,” focusing almost ex-
clusively on the Illinois child pornography statute12 that lies at the heart of 
Hollins and analyzes how the Hollins case might have been decided differ-
ently if Stevens had been considered in the briefing and arguing of the case. 
This Note also suggests an alternative treatment for the “child pornogra-
phy” at the heart of the Hollins case. 
Part I of this Note will address the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution, particularly the freedom of expression and speech that 
the First Amendment protects. This part will also discuss the expressions 
and speech that have been found ineligible for First Amendment protection. 
Part II will address the Hollins case. It will explore the history and the con-
text in which Marshall Hollins was convicted of possession, distribution, 
and creation of child pornography. I will also summarize the reasoning of 
the Illinois Supreme Court in upholding his conviction, as well as the dis-
sent by Justice Burke. 
Part III will address the Stevens case. I will explain the situation faced 
by the Supreme Court in the Stevens case and the decision that the majority 
came to regarding the sale and distribution of videos that depicted animal 
cruelty. The importance of the Stevens case does not lie solely on the result 
for the parties in that case but rather in the implications it holds for criminal 
prosecutions in cases of a related situation, such as those that address the 
production, sale and distribution of child pornography. 
Part IV of this Note will address the majority’s reasoning in Hollins,
and the difference in how the case and the facts would have been analyzed 
under the Supreme Court’s decision in Stevens. In this section I will also 
determine whether a standard different than rational review should apply to 
the application of child pornography situations similar to those of Mr. Hol-
lins and if so, what that standard should be. 
Part V will address the challenges and stigma that people like Mr. 
Hollins face when convicted of a sex offense. This stigma is greater than it 
would be for a conviction for a non-sex related offense, such as assault, 
battery or theft. This section will argue that when the “minor” depicted in 
child pornography is old enough to consent to the underlying act of sexual 
relations, but not to the creation of the pornography itself, courts need to 
abandon their bright-line approach in deciding whether punishment should 
 12.  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-20.1(a)(1)(i), (a)(1)(ii) and (a)(4) (2008). 
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be meted out and should instead adopt a test that considers the totality of 
the circumstances in reaching a decision. 
I. THE UNPROTECTED EXCEPTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The First Amendment of the Constitution provides that “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.”13 The First Amendment also 
applies to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.14
However, the right to free speech is not absolute. Justice Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes famously said, “[y]our right to swing your arms ends just 
where the other man’s nose begins.”15 No right is absolute and depending 
on the nature of the right, the government must make an appropriate show-
ing to justify the abridgment of that right. There are currently three levels 
of scrutiny that are applied to cases that deal with the implication of cases 
presenting constitutional due process or equal protection claims issues re-
lated to the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment.16 The dif-
ferent levels of scrutiny are discussed in Part IV below. 
Furthermore, the First Amendment also protects photographs, draw-
ings, and videos, amongst other expressions. The right to free speech is also 
not limited only to speech that is verbal.17 The First Amendment can be 
invoked to prohibit restrictions on core political speech,18 commercial 
 13.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 14.  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“For present purposes we may and do as-
sume that” the right of freedom of speech and freedom of the press are “among the fundamental person-
al rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from 
impairment by the states.”).  
 15.  Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 957 (1919) 
(This quote is actually frequently credited to Justice Holmes but was instead written by Mr. Chafee in 
his 1919 Harvard Law Review article.). 
 16.  See generally Eric Berger, Deference Determination and Stealth Constitutional Decision 
Making, 98 IOWA L. REV. 465 (2013). 
 17.  Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1989) (“It is, in short, not simply the verbal or 
nonverbal nature of the expression, but the governmental interest at stake, that helps to determine 
whether a restriction on that expression is valid.”). 
 18.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (quoting Eu v. San 
Francisco County Democratic Central Commission, 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (“The First Amendment 
has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.”) 
(internal quotations omitted).  
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speech,19 and expressive conduct.20 However, the First Amendment does 
not protect certain types of speech that fit into specific categories. Those 
categories include fighting words21, incitement to crime22, threats23, tor-
tious speech like slander and libel24 and, notably, for the purposes of this 
Note, obscenity25 and child pornography26
A. The Exception for Obscenity 
Justice Potter Stewart famously stated that while obscenity is hard to 
define, “I know it when I see it.”27 The Supreme Court has developed a 
working definition of the materials that are considered obscene. First, the 
materials must be such that “the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals 
to the prurient interest.”28 Second, the materials must “depict[] or de-
scribe[], in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by 
applicable state law.”29 Third, the materials “taken as a whole,” must 
“lack[] serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”30 All three 
factors must be met in order for a work to be deemed obscene and unpro-
tected by the First Amendment.31
 19.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (“The 
First Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects commercial 
speech from unwarranted governmental regulation.”).  
 20.  United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315 (1990) (“The Government concedes in these 
cases, as it must, that appellees’ flag burning constituted expressive conduct . . . but claim[s] that flag 
burning as a mode of expression, like obscenity or ‘fighting words,’ does not enjoy the full protection of 
the First Amendment. This we decline to do.”). 
 21.  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (“There are certain well-defined 
and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought 
to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and 
the insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace.”). 
 22.  See generally Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); see also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 
395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 23.  Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 362 (2003) (“[T]he First Amendment permits content dis-
crimination ‘based on the very reasons why the particular class of speech at issue [threats] . . . is pro-
scribable.’”). 
 24.  See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also generally United 
States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
 25.  Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 496 (1985) (“[T]he protection of the First 
Amendment [does] not extend to obscene speech.”). 
 26.  New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982). 
 27.  Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).  
 28.  Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
 29.  Id.
 30.  Id.
 31.  Catherine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 321, 332–33 (1984) 
(quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 24). 
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B. The Exception for Child Pornography 
Traditionally, child pornography has been categorically exempted 
from First Amendment protection.32 The Ferber Court found that child 
pornography did not need to first be determined obscene to be subject to 
regulation33 using five reasons for this exception: (1) the government’s 
compelling interest in preventing children from being sexually exploited; 
(2) the intrinsic relationship between the distribution of children being vis-
ually depicted engaged in sexual activity and the sexual abuse of children; 
(3) the advertising and selling of child pornography provides an economic 
motive to those who produce child pornography; (4) there is negligible 
artistic value in the visual depiction of children engaged in sexual activity; 
and (5) withholding First Amendment protection from child pornography is 
consistent with stare decisis and previous holdings regarding obscenity and 
so child pornography does not need to first be deemed obscene before the 
States and Congress can regulate it.34
Additionally, Congress passed the Child Pornography Prevention Act 
of 1996 in an attempt to restrict the creation and spread of child pornogra-
phy on the Internet, including virtual child pornography.35 The Supreme 
Court struck down two provisions of the Act in the 2002 case of Ashcroft v. 
Free Speech Coalition.36 The provisions prohibited “any visual depiction, 
including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-
generated image or picture” that “is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging 
in sexually explicit conduct,”37 and included any images “advertised, pro-
moted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys 
the impression” that it depicts “a minor engaging in sexually explicit con-
duct.”38 The Ashcroft Court found that the statute prohibited speech “de-
spite its serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value,” which would 
include visual depictions of teenagers having sex, a theme common to tele-
vision shows and movies in the present day.39 The Court even gave explicit 
mention to the 1996 film version of William Shakespeare’s Romeo + Juliet,
starring Leonardo DiCaprio,40 and found that the statute prohibited speech 
for a reason other than the pornography laws, which seek to address the 
 32.  Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764, n. 17.  
 33.  Id. at 751 n.2. 
 34.  Id. at 756-64. 
 35.  18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2008). 
 36.  See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal, 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002). 
 37.  18 U.S.C. §2256(8)(B) (2008). 
 38.  18 U.S.C. §2256(8)(D) (2008). 
 39.  Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 246. 
 40.  Id. at 247. 
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damage inflicted upon the children involved; the law was found to lack the 
“required link between its prohibitions and the affront to community stand-
ards prohibited by the definition of obscenity.”41 The Court struck down 
the two provisions for being unconstitutional and overbroad.42
II. THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT AND THE HOLLINS CASE
A. Factual Background and the Path to the Illinois Supreme Court 
Defendant Marshall C. Hollins was charged with three counts of child 
pornography under the Illinois Compiled Statutes on March 19, 2009.43
The three counts all implicated subsections of the Illinois child pornogra-
phy statute under 720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a) and applied to “persons who pho-
tograph or use for photographic purposes ‘any child whom he knows or 
reasonably should know to be under the age of 18.’”44
Mr. Hollins was thirty-two years old at the time he took the photo-
graphs of his and his seventeen-year-old girlfriend’s (A.V.’s) genitals.45
Mr. Hollins and A.V. met when A.V. was sixteen years old “and began a 
consensual sexual relationship” while A.V. was seventeen years old.46 At 
the time, both A.V. and Mr. Hollins were students at Highland College.47
The photographs were taken using Mr. Hollins’ cellular telephone 
“[d]uring a sexual encounter that took place inside A.V.’s car” behind a 
building on the Highland College campus.48 At A.V.’s request, Mr. Hollins 
later emailed the pictures to A.V.’s email address, where her mother later 
found them and identified the shaved pubic area of A.V.49
A.V.’s mother took the photographs to the Detective Sergeant Jim 
Drehoble of the Freeport police department, where Drehoble initially de-
termined that there was “no crime for sexual assault or abuse offenses due 
to the age of” A.V.50 Upon A.V.’s mother’s subsequent complaint, Detec-
tive Drehoble and another detective visited Mr. Hollins at his home where 
he acknowledged A.V.’s age, his knowledge of her age at the time of the 
sexual relationship and that he had taken the pictures that Detective Dreho-
 41.  Id. at 249. 
 42.  Id. at 258. 
 43.  People v. Hollins, 971 N.E.2d 504, 506 (Ill. 2012). 
 44.  Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 7, People v. Hollins, 971 N.E.2d 504 (Ill. 2012) (No. 10-
0051) (quoting 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-20.1(a)(1)(i), (a)(1)(ii) and (a)(4) (2008)).  
 45.  Id. at 3. 
 46.  Id.
 47.  Id.
 48.  Id. at 4.  
 49.  Id. at 3–4.  
 50.  Hollins, 971 N.E.2d at 506-07. 
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ble had received from A.V.’s mother.51 Neither the face of A.V. or Mr. 
Hollins appeared “in any of the photographs and there [were] no identify-
ing marks such as scars or tattoos.”52
Mr. Hollins filed two motions attacking the constitutional validity of 
the Illinois child pornography statute, however, the trial court denied both 
motions.53 He later elected to proceed by a stipulated bench trial wherein it 
was established that: (1) Detective Drehoble investigated a complaint made 
by A.V.’s mother regarding photographs of her daughter and Mr. Hollins; 
(2) A.V. was seventeen at the time the photographs were taken, her sexual 
relationship with Mr. Hollins occurred while she was seventeen years old, 
and Mr. Hollins had taken a picture(s) of her during one of their sexual 
encounters; and (3) A.V.’s mother found the pictures and could identify her 
daughter’s pubic region and that she recognized the sending email address 
as belonging to Mr. Hollins.54
Mr. Hollins was found guilty on all three counts and sentenced to 
three concurrent eight-year sentences in the Illinois Department of Correc-
tions.55 It should be noted that at no time did Mr. Hollins deny his actual 
knowledge of A.V.’s age nor did he engage in any sexual relations with 
A.V. before she attained the age of seventeen, which is the legal age of 
consent for sexual relations in the State of Illinois.56 Mr. Hollins appealed 
his conviction, “arguing that the child pornography statute is unconstitu-
tional as applied to him and that his convictions violated the one-act, one-
crime doctrine.”57 The appellate court affirmed Mr. Hollins’ convictions 
and rejected his constitutional challenges to the child pornography stat-
ute.58
B. The Arguments before the Illinois Supreme Court 
On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, Mr. Hollins challenged his 
convictions on two grounds: (1) “the child pornography statute, as applied 
to [his] case, denie[d] defendant due process of the law under the United 
 51.  Id. at 507.  
 52.  Id. at 516 (Burke, J., dissenting).  
 53.  Id. at 506. 
 54.  Id. at 506-07.  
 55.  Id. at 507.  
 56.  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-1.60(c)(1) (2013) (“A person commits aggravated criminal sexual 
abuse if (i) that person is 17 years of age or over and commits an act of sexual conduct with a victim 
who is under 13 years of age; or (ii) commits an act of sexual conduct with a victim who is at least 13 
years of age but under 17 years of age and the person uses force or threat of force to commit the act.”).  
 57.  Hollins, 971 N.E.2d at 507. 
 58.  Id.
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States and Illinois constitutions; and (2) the child pornography statute as 
applied violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and Illi-
nois constitutions.”59
Specifically, Mr. Hollins argued that the application of the child por-
nography to him and A.V. does nothing to further the legislature’s intent to 
protect children from “sexual exploitation and abuse” because A.V. was 
seventeen at the time and could legally consent to the “private sexual activ-
ity” that he and she chose to photograph.60 He argued that A.V., under the 
definitions provided in the child pornography statute, was a seventeen-
year-old “child” who had legally consented to sexual activity with him and 
who “was involved in a legal, consensual sexual relationship with her boy-
friend.”61
Further, Mr. Hollins argued that his due process rights were violated 
because of the “illogical inconsistency” in Illinois law that treated his sev-
enteen-year-old girlfriend as a child for purposes of the child pornography 
statute but did not criminalize his consensual sexual encounters with her, 
backing him into a “legislative trap.”62
Additionally, Mr. Hollins argued that his prosecution violated the 
equal protection clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions and 
his due process because the child pornography statutes criminalize his be-
havior but do not criminalize the behavior of other adults who have con-
sensual sexual relations with their legal, consenting sex partners.63
C. The Majority Opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court 
The Illinois Supreme Court found a “rational basis for the child por-
nography statute under both due process and equal protection analyses” and 
subsequently affirmed the judgments of the lower courts.64 In doing so, the 
Court was strongly persuaded by a similar case that arose out of the Ne-
braska Supreme Court in State v. Senters.65 Mr. Hollins himself conceded 
that because what was involved did not implicate a fundamental right (i.e., 
photographing yourself and your sexual partner in intimate poses), that 
rational basis review was the proper test for reviewing whether or not his 
due process rights had not been violated.66
 59.  Id. at 507-08.  
 60.  Id. at 509. 
 61.  Id.
 62.  Id. at 514. 
 63.  Id. at 515. 
 64.  Id. at 508. 
 65.  State v. Senters, 699 N.W.2d 810 (Neb. 2005).  
 66.  Hollins, 971 N.E.2d at 508-09.  
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Under the rational basis test, a statute is upheld if the statute’s provi-
sions reasonably implement its public purpose.67 Child pornography stat-
utes are meant to prevent the sexual abuse and exploitation of children.68
Based on the Supreme Court’s findings in previous cases, the Illinois Su-
preme Court declared that “child pornography is intrinsically related to 
child sexual abuse and states have a compelling interest in safeguarding the 
physical and psychological health of children.”69 “[C]hild pornography is 
an offense against the child and causes harm ‘to the physiological, emo-
tional, and mental health’ of the child.”70 “Child pornography is particular-
ly harmful because the child’s actions are reduced to a recording which 
could haunt the child in future years, especially in light of the mass distri-
bution system for child pornography.”71 The Supreme Court had also pre-
viously found that child pornography could affect a child’s “reputational 
interest and emotional well-being.”72
The Illinois Supreme Court then conducted a very detailed analysis of 
the Senters case, in which the defendant videotaped himself and his seven-
teen-year-old girlfriend having sex.73 It should be noted that, unlike Illi-
nois, Nebraska sets sixteen as the age of consent for sexual relations.74 The 
Nebraska Supreme Court in Senters relied heavily on a federal case with a 
similar factual premise, outcome, and result.75
The majority in Hollins found the reasoning in both the Senters case 
and the Bach case (which the Senters opinion frequently cited to) extremely 
persuasive and found that under rational basis review, the Illinois legisla-
ture had a legitimate government purpose in enacting its child pornography 
statute to protect “children from sexual abuse and exploitation” and that 
prohibiting photography of minors engaged in sexual acts bore a “rational 
relationship” to protecting them from abuse.76 The majority found that 
raising the legal age of consent from seventeen to eighteen in order to aid 
government enforcement of the child pornography statute was also a “rea-
sonable means of accomplishing this legitimate government purpose.”77
 67.  Id. at 509. 
 68.  People v. Geever, 522 N.E.2d 1200, 1206 (Ill. 1988). 
 69.  Hollins, 971 N.E.2d at 509 (citing People v. Alexander, 791 N.E.2d 506 (Ill. 2003)). 
 70.  People v. Lamborn, 708 N.E.2d 350, 353 (Ill. 1999) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 
747, 758 (1982)).  
 71.  Id. (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759). 
 72.  Hollins, 971 N.E.2d at 509. 
 73.  Id. at 510. 
 74.  Id.
 75.  Id. (citing United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622 (8th Cir. 2005)).  
 76.  Id. at 511. 
 77.  Id.
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While acknowledging that the underlying act that Mr. Hollins and his girl-
friend engaged in was legal, the court found that the statute prohibited re-
cording of the legal conduct, because of the “consequences to the child that 
flow” from the recording of the legal sexual activity.78 A seventeen-year-
old may legally be able to consent to sexual activity but “he or she may still 
be unable to appreciate the subtle dangers of memorializing such activity 
on film or in a photograph.”79 The majority stated, “[T]he desire to aid law 
enforcement in the prosecution of an offense has been found to be a rea-
sonable, rationally related way to accomplish a legitimate government pur-
pose” and so upheld the child pornography statute, which changed the 
definition of child from eighteen years old to seventeen years old or young-
er.80 The majority denied all of Mr. Hollins’ challenges to his convictions 
and affirmed both his convictions and the child pornography statute.81
D. Justice Burke’s Dissent in the Illinois Supreme Court 
Justice Burke, joined by Judge Freeman, dissented from the majority 
opinion.82 Citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Stevens, Jus-
tice Burke noted that “Stevens is binding authority on [the Illinois Supreme 
Court], and the decision goes to a core issue” in the case – “the level of 
scrutiny to apply to defendant’s constitutional challenge.”83 Neither the 
appellant nor the State had argued Stevens in their briefs, nor had the ma-
jority addressed the case in the Court’s opinion. Justice Burke’s dissent was 
premised on a requirement that the parties re-brief their own arguments to 
determine the “effect of Stevens’ holding – that child pornography, for 
purposes of the first amendment, exists only if it is ‘an integral part of con-
duct in violation of a valid criminal statute’” on the disposition of Mr. Hol-
lins’ case before the Illinois Supreme Court.84
While there is no per se exception for child pornography for first 
amendment purposes, child pornography “in the federal constitutional 
sense” applies to photographs that depict activity that are “an integral part 
of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.”85 The significance of 
the Stevens case is that it changed the belief that “any sexually explicit 
 78.  Id. at 512. 
 79.  Id. at 514. 
 80.  Id. at 515. 
 81.  Id. at 516. 
 82.  Id. at 516 (Burke, J., dissenting).  
 83.  Id. at 522 (Burke, J., dissenting).  
 84.  Id. (Burke, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 471 (2010)). 
 85.  Id. at 520 (Burke, J., dissenting)  
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image of minor was child pornography.”86 The question of whether a pho-
tograph constituted child pornography was now whether there was “specif-
ic illegal conduct to which the speech is integral.”87 Stevens explained the 
Ferber case as not creating a new categorical exception to First Amend-
ment free speech protection for child pornography but instead held child 
pornography to be a “special example of the historically unprotected cate-
gory of speech integral to the commission of a crime.”88 The Stevens Court 
made it clear that “child pornography laws cannot be constitutionally ap-
plied in circumstances where no actual minor is sexually abused during the 
production of the material” and can only “be stripped of its constitutional 
protection if it records actual sexual abuse of child victims.”89
Because there was nothing unlawful in the photos taken by Mr. Hol-
lins and his seventeen-year-old girlfriend, the photographs are “not child 
pornography as defined by the Supreme Court for purpose of the first 
amendment.”90 Therefore, rational basis review cannot be presumed to be 
the appropriate standard or test for determining the constitutionality of the 
Illinois child pornography statute as it applies to Mr. Hollis and his girl-
friend and the photographs that they took; either a different standard should 
apply or a different procedure should be used in determining whether the 
photographs taken meet the Supreme Court’s definition of child pornogra-
phy.91
III. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE STEVENS CASE
This section will discuss the Stevens case because an understanding of 
the background and the legal reasoning behind Stevens is necessary to un-
derstand the implications that it could have on cases like Hollins.
A. Background of the Stevens Case 
In the early 2000s, Congress became aware of the production, distri-
bution and sale of “crush videos,” which, according to a House Committee 
Report, featured the intentional torture and killing of helpless animals, in-
cluding cats, dogs, monkeys, mice, and hamsters.92 “Crush videos often 
 86.  Antonio M. Haynes, The Age of Consent: When is Sexting No Longer “Speech Integral to 
Criminal Conduct”?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 394-95 (2012). 
 87.  Id. at 395. 
 88.  The Supreme Court 2009 Term, Leading Cases, 124 HARV. L. REV. 179, 247 (2010). 
 89.  Walters, supra note 6, at 113–14. 
 90.  Hollins, 971 N.E.2d at 521 (Burke, J., dissenting). 
 91.  Id.
 92.  United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 465-66 (2010).  
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depict women slowly crushing animals to death ‘with their bare feet or 
while wearing high heeled shoes,’ sometimes while ‘talking to the animals 
in a kind of dominatrix patter’ over ‘[t]he cries and squeals of the animals, 
obviously in great pain.’”93 Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 48 in response to 
these “crush videos”, which criminalized the creation, selling and posses-
sion of such videos.94
B. The Path to the Supreme Court 
The case arose when Robert Stevens was charged with violating the 
statute for selling videos that featured pit bulls engaging in dogfights and 
attacking other animals.95 When Stevens moved to dismiss the indictment, 
arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 48 was unconstitutional for being facially invalid 
under the First Amendment, the trial court denied his motion.96 Stevens 
was convicted on three counts under 18 U.S.C. § 48 and was sentenced to 
serve three concurrent sentences of thirty-seven (37) months.97
Stevens appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, where an en 
banc court reversed, on the grounds that 18 U.S.C. § 48 was facially uncon-
stitutional.98 The Third Circuit en banc decision found that the First 
Amendment protected speech that 18 U.S.C. § 48 regulated, while simulta-
neously declining to find “a new category of unprotected speech for depic-
tions of animal cruelty” and rejecting the government’s analogy that 
depictions of cruelty to animals are analogous to portrayals of child por-
nography.99
The Third Circuit specifically found that the statute would not survive 
strict scrutiny as a “content-based regulation of protected speech”100 be-
cause the statute lacked a compelling government interest. Further, the 
statute was “neither narrowly tailored to preventing animal cruelty nor the 
least restrictive means of doing so.”101 In dicta provided in an extended 
footnote, the Third Circuit also speculated that 18 U.S.C. § 48 might also 
be “unconstitutionally overbroad” because it is potentially applicable to a 
 93.  Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 106-397, at 2 (1999)).  
 94.  Id.
 95.  Id. at 466. 
 96.  Id. at 467. 
 97.  Id. at 466 (Stevens was indicted on three counts for selling, on his website, three videos which 
were as follows: Japan Pit Fights, Pick-A-Winna: A Pit Bull Documentary, and Catch Dogs and Coun-
try Living.). 
 98.  Id. at 467. 
 99.  Id.
 100.  Id.
 101.  Id.
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wide array of constitutionally protected speech and is far too wide-
sweeping to be limited only by prosecutorial discretion.102 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in 2009.103
C. The Supreme Court Grants Certiorari in the Stevens Case 
The Supreme Court stated that, generally, the First Amendment pro-
vides a protection from the abridgement of free speech and that Congress 
cannot restrict speech due to “its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its 
content.”104 Any statute that restricts speech due to its content or subject 
matter is presumptively invalid and the government bears the burden of 
rebutting that presumption.105 However, the Supreme Court did recognize 
that there are certain restrictions in a “few limited areas” in which expres-
sion based on content can be regulated but was also quick to point out that 
the First Amendment does not allow the government freedom to “disregard 
these traditional limitations.”106 These limitations include obscenity, 107
defamation,108 fraud, 109 incitement,110 and “speech integral to criminal 
conduct.”111 Traditional limitations on free expression protection are “well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punish-
ment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional prob-
lem.”112
The government argued that depictions of animal cruelty, such as the 
crush videos at issue for Mr. Stevens, should be added to the list of tradi-
tional limitations to First Amendment freedom of expression.113 The gov-
ernment rightly stated that animal cruelty has a long history of being 
prohibited in American law, dating back to the early settlement of the Col-
onies.114 However, the Supreme Court rightly pointed out that while animal 
cruelty might have a long history of prohibition in the United States, the 
same could not be said for depictions of animal cruelty.115 The government 
 102.  Id.
 103.  Id.
 104.  Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002). 
 105.  United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000). 
 106.  Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468. 
 107.  Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957). 
 108.  Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254–55 (1952). 
 109.  Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976). 
 110.  Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969). 
 111.  Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice, Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949). 
 112.  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 569, 571–72 (1942). 
 113.  United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460,469 (2010). 
 114.  Id. at 469-70. 
 115.  Id.
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further argued that a long-standing tradition of regulation is not a condition 
or requirement for prohibition. The government posited a question aimed at 
determining what forms of expression would fall outside the reach of the 
First Amendment’s protection: “Whether a given category of speech enjoys 
First Amendment protection depends upon a categorical balancing of the 
value of the speech against its societal costs.”116 The Court noted that such 
a question leaves a “startling and dangerous” statement about where First 
Amendment protection is applicable.117
While the government’s ‘test’ was derived from previous Supreme 
Court decisions that described the categories of traditionally limited speech 
in language that struck as the “evil to be restricted” or as having “such 
slight social value as a step to truth,” the descriptions of the traditional 
categories were not a test that the Court set forth and or a test the Court 
applied to determine what speech should be granted or denied First 
Amendment protection.118 In fact, in upholding a child pornography law in 
the state of New York, the Supreme Court did not do so on the “basis of a 
simple cost-benefit analysis,”119 but because the market for child pornogra-
phy was “intrinsically related” to the underlying abuse and therefore “an 
integral part of the production of such materials, an activity illegal 
throughout the Nation.”120 Therefore, the Court’s decision on child pornog-
raphy statutes in Ferber did not create a new category of unprotected 
speech. Instead, the Court found that the child pornography analysis was 
grounded “in a previously recognized, long-established category of unpro-
tected speech.”121 While the Court recognized that certain categories of 
speech have long been prohibited or unprotected but have yet to be identi-
fied or analyzed in the nation’s case law, there was no evidence that “de-
pictions of animal cruelty” was among these unidentified or analyzed 
categories.122 The Stevens Court specifically refused to carve out a new 
exception to First Amendment protected speech for “depictions of animal 
cruelty” and reviewed the challenge under the existing doctrine.123
The First Amendment allows a law to be challenged facially and in-
validated as overbroad if “a substantial number of its applications are un-
constitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate 
 116.  Id. at 470. 
 117.  Id.
 118.  Id. at 470-471.  
 119.  Id. at 471. 
 120.  New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759-61 (1982). 
 121.  Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471. 
 122.  Id. at 472. 
 123.  Id.
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sweep.”124 While Stevens’ argument was based on 18 U.S.C. § 48’s broad 
application to “common depictions of ordinary and lawful activities,” the 
government defended solely on the ground that it interpreted the statute 
narrowly to apply only to specific types of “extreme” material.125 The “first 
step in overbreadth analysis” requires construing the statute; “[I]t is impos-
sible to determine whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing 
what the statute covers.”126
The Supreme Court found that 18 U.S.C. § 48 applied to 
“any . . . depiction” in which “a living animal is intentionally maimed, 
mutilated, torture, wounded, or killed.”127 Such a definition not only did 
not include that the act actually be “cruel” but the statute did require that 
the act be illegal, which, given the “myriad federal and state laws concern-
ing the proper treatment of animals” created a wide range and variety of 
which acts were illegal in which states.128 Further, because the statute dealt 
with depictions of illegal acts, this meant that a depiction that is not subject 
to 18 U.S.C. § 48 in one state (because the underlying act is legal) would 
become illegal if it made its way to a state where the underlying act depict-
ed is illegal.129 The Supreme Court acknowledged that this would also 
apply to various hunting magazines, which were a $135 million a year in-
dustry at the time of the decision, many of which often—and perhaps nec-
essarily—depicted the killing of animals.130
Whether or not an individual was prosecuted for a depiction depended 
on the mercy of the prosecutor. Although the government contended that it 
would only prosecute for those that depicted “extreme” cruelty, the prose-
cutors had discretion to decide what constituted “extreme.”131 Furthermore, 
an unconstitutional statute cannot be upheld “merely because the Govern-
ment promise[s] to use it responsibly.”132 The Supreme Court therefore 
struck down 18 U.S.C. § 48 as unconstitutional, for its broad reach and its 
very real probability of criminalizing the depiction of many legal acts, in 
addition to the criminalization of illegal acts.133
 124.  Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008). 
 125.  Stevens, 559 U.S. at 473. 
 126.  United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293 (2008). 
 127.  Stevens, 559 U.S. at 474. 
 128.  Id. at 475. 
 129.  Id. at 475-76. 
 130.  Id. at 476. 
 131.  Id. at 480. 
 132.  Id.
 133.  Id.
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As discussed in Section II.D above, the Stevens Court made it clear 
that “child pornography laws cannot be constitutionally applied in circum-
stances where no actual minor is sexually abused during the production of 
the material.”134 Therefore, “child pornography can only be stripped of its 
constitutional protection if it records actual sexual abuse of child vic-
tims”135 and, as discussed in the following section, sets a higher standard 
than simple rational review in determining the constitutionality of child 
pornography prosecutions. 
IV. APPLYING STEVENS TO HOLLINS: LEGALITY OF THE UNDERLYING ACT
Having decided that rational basis review is no longer appropriate in 
light of Stevens, what is the appropriate test that should be used and under 
what standard should child pornography statutes and prosecutions be re-
viewed? As mentioned in Part I above, there are three levels of scrutiny 
that are applied to cases that deal with the implication of cases presenting 
constitutional due process or equal protection claims issues under the Fifth 
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment. These levels of scrutiny are 
applied when a legislative act, like 18 U.S.C. § 48, infringes upon the First 
Amendment rights of free speech.136
The lowest level of scrutiny is rational basis review. Rational basis re-
view requires that the government action is a reasonable means that the 
government may legitimately pursue.137 The test requires that the govern-
mental action be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.138
This level of scrutiny is the most deferential to the government action and 
does not actually require that the legitimate interest be the one that prompt-
ed the government to act; it allows the reviewing court to hypothesize and 
determine if any legitimate government interest exists.139
 134.  Walters, supra note 6, at 114. 
 135.  Id.
 136.  See generally Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353 (2009) (under rational basis 
review, a state has a reasonable interest in in avoiding the appearance of impropriety by not allowing 
payroll deductions to fund partisan political activity); Davenport v. Washington Ed. Assn., 551 U.S. 
177 (2007) (content-based restrictions on free speech are subject to strict scrutiny); Turner Broadcasting 
System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (upheld regulation by a federal agency of broadcast media 
when the regulation served an important governmental interest that did not need to be narrowly tailored 
and the least restrictive means available; Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (not all laws that 
regulate the right to vote are subject to strict scrutiny); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 
U.S. 377 (2000) (in light of the importance of political speech, state laws that limit political contribu-
tions are subject to strict scrutiny and must be narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest). 
 137.  See generally Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 616-17 (1985). 
 138.  United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). 
 139.  Amy Knight Burns, Counterfactual Contradictions: Interpretive Error in the Analysis of 
AEDPA, 65 STAN. L. REV. 203, 211 n.23 (2013) (citing Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th 
Cir. 1995) (“The first step in determining whether legislation survives rational-basis scrutiny is identify-
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The highest level of scrutiny is strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny review 
requires that the government action be one that is justified by a compelling 
governmental interest that is narrowly tailored to achieve the governmental 
interest.140 Furthermore, the action undertaken must be the “least restrictive 
means” by which the governmental interest can be achieved.141 Govern-
mental actions that are challenged under strict scrutiny are frequently and 
usually, but not always, found to be unconstitutional.142
There is also an intermediate level of scrutiny, appropriately called in-
termediate scrutiny or at times, heightened scrutiny. Intermediate scrutiny 
requires a showing that the challenged governmental action furthers an 
important governmental interest in a way that is substantially related to that 
interest.143 The Supreme Court has thus far analyzed sex-based classifica-
tions144, issues of illegitimacy145 and restrictions on speech that are con-
tent-neutral146 under this intermediate level of scrutiny. 
There have also been indications that there exists a fourth level of 
scrutiny, which is nestled between rational basis review and strict scrutiny 
and lies more or less level with intermediate scrutiny. “Heightened scruti-
ny” has in the past been used interchangeably with “intermediate scrutiny” 
but it is unclear if the two are actually one and the same. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit developed a three-prong test for 
heightened scrutiny. The test required showing: (1) that the governmental 
action “must advance an important governmental interest; (2) that the “in-
trusion must significantly further that interest”; and (3) that the “intrusion 
must be necessary to further that interest.”147 This three-prong test for 
heightened scrutiny differs from the two-prong test that had previously 
applied to the interchangeable intermediate review/heightened scrutiny. 
However, the federal government’s decision to repeal the popularly titled 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” law has left the existence, applicability, and legit-
imacy of the three-pronged test for heightened scrutiny in question. Taking 
into consideration the possibility that Mr. Hollins’ case can be decided 
without reaching a constitutional argument based upon the proper standard 
ing a legitimate government purpose—a goal—which the enacting government body could have been 
pursuing. The actual motivations of the enacting governmental body are entirely irrelevant.”). 
 140.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 688 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 141.  Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 658 (2004). 
 142.  See generally Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of 
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV 793 (2006). 
143. Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980). 
 144.  See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976). 
 145.  Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
 146.  See generally United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 147.  Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 819 (9th Cir. 2008).  
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of review, this Note will analyze Mr. Hollins’ situation using both the 
heightened scrutiny test developed by the Ninth Circuit and an alternative 
method that is fairly common in criminal prosecution. 
A. The Insufficiency of Rational Basis Review 
“[W]hereas before Stevens many believed—perhaps erroneously—that 
any sexually explicit image of a minor was child pornography, this belief is 
now fatally flawed.”148 The initial question in determining “whether a par-
ticular nonobscene image constitutes child pornography” should instead be 
“whether there is specific illegal conduct to which the speech is inte-
gral.”149
Justice Burke noted in her dissent that there “was nothing unlawful 
about the production of the photographs taken by [Mr. Hollins] because the 
sexual conduct” between the parties was entirely legal.150 The photographs 
are therefore “not child pornography as defined by the Supreme Court for 
purposes of the first amendment” and it cannot simply be presumed “that 
rational basis review is appropriate” in determining whether the act of pho-
tographing himself and A.V. is worthy of criminal sanctions.151 What 
standard of review is appropriate? 
B. Applying Heightened Scrutiny to Hollins 
The applicable level of scrutiny to apply to the issue faced by the Illi-
nois Supreme Court could be the heightened scrutiny standard and the cor-
responding three-prong test that the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit developed for the following reasons. The Witt case involved 
the ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ (“DADT”) policy of the United States military, 
in which the Ninth Circuit reviewing the DADT policy following the Su-
preme Court’s 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas.152 The case was the 
first time that a United States Circuit Court of Appeals had directly held 
that “Lawrence v. Texas requires a higher level of scrutiny than mere ra-
tional review.”153 The Court found that the Lawrence case’s actual lan-
guage was unhelpful in determining what level of scrutiny had been applied 
 148.  Haynes, supra note 86, at 394–95. 
 149.  Id.
 150.  People v. Hollins, 971 N.E.2d 504, 521 (2012) (Burke, J., dissenting). 
 151.  Id.
 152.  Jessica L. Beeler, Witt v. Department of the Air Force Subjects “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” to 
Intermediate Scrutiny, 39 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 363, 363-66 (2009). 
 153.  Id.
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in Lawrence, “perhaps intentionally so.”154 Focusing on what the Supreme 
Court did do in Lawrence, the Witt Court noted that the Lawrence opinion 
overruled Bowers v. Hardwick.155 While focusing on the liberty interest at 
stake, the Court relied on cases that applied intermediate scrutiny in reach-
ing its decision and focused on whether there existed a legitimate state 
interest, all factors inconsistent with rational basis review.156
The Ninth Circuit also found Sell v. United States157 to be instructive 
and adopted three of the four prongs used in Sell, determining that the 
fourth, which was exclusive to medical contexts, to be inapplicable. The 
three prongs required that “when the government attempts to intrude upon 
the personal and private lives of homosexuals, in a manner that implicates 
the rights identified in Lawrence, the government must advance an im-
portant governmental interest, the intrusion must significantly further that 
interest, and the intrusion must be necessary to further that interest.”158 The 
Court also found that the analysis must be done as applied to Witt and not 
facially.159
As applied to Mr. Hollins (and not facially), the Illinois child pornog-
raphy statutes do advance a significant government interest-the protection 
of children. However, unlike in Witt where the record was insufficiently 
developed to determine the remaining prongs, there is enough in the record 
to analyze the same in the case of Mr. Hollins.160 As already stated, Mr. 
Hollins and A.V. met while both were attending classes at a community 
college, indicating that A.V. was mature enough to already be making deci-
sions about her future education and to plan for her future. In such a case, 
where the “child” in question might only be seventeen years old, it is diffi-
cult to find how the child pornography statutes, which were intended to 
protect children from feeling the future ramifications of decisions made 
while they were unable to appreciate the same, significantly furthers the 
state’s interest in protecting A.V. She was obviously not a naïve child who 
needed the protection of the state but rather a young woman who was al-
ready making adult decisions, at least when it came to her education and to 
her sexual activity. For that same reason, it is also difficult to say that the 
governmental intrusion is necessary to protect A.V., as she is not a ‘child’ 
in need of protection as the Illinois legislature likely envisioned when the 
 154.  Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 814 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 155.  Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 156.  Beeler, supra note 152, at 369-70. 
 157.  539 U.S. 166 (2003). 
 158.  Witt, 527 F.3d at 819. 
 159.  Id. at 819-20. 
 160.  Id. at 821. 
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statute was enacted. We can then conclude that, per Witt’s heightened scru-
tiny analysis, the statute as applied to Mr. Hollins was unconstitutional 
because it could not satisfy the prongs requiring that it significantly further 
the state’s interest and that it be necessary in order to do so. 
C. The Constitutionality of the Child Pornography Statutes as Applied to 
Hollins
“Child pornography is particularly harmful because the child’s actions 
are reduced to a recording which could haunt the child in future years, es-
pecially in light of the mass distribution system for child pornography.”161
Considering the emphasis on the “mass distribution system” that exists for 
child pornography, it is argued that child pornography statutes are enacted 
to protect children from exploitation when that exploitation is being done in 
order to produce and distribute child pornography in the commercial sense. 
Can such statutes even be applicable when the child pornography under 
consideration is being produced for private use only, especially when the 
child under question is seventeen years old, like A.V.? 
The situation can be analogized roughly to the situation with marijua-
na in both the federal and state governments of the United States. Current-
ly, possession of marijuana is a federal offense under the Controlled 
Substances Act.162 However, some states have acted to decriminalize mari-
juana, either for medical purposes only163 or have decriminalized marijuana 
entirely.164 In such an instance (which has yet to reach the Supreme Court), 
a Colorado or Washington resident who is legally allowed under the laws 
of their state to possess and use marijuana could still be charged in federal 
court for their legal state-level activity. While possession of child pornog-
raphy is not legal in any state, it isn’t hard to make the connection that 
someone like Mr. Hollins, who—with the consent of his partner—
memorializes a sexual act in some form of media for his own personal use 
(like the Coloradoan who keeps a few joints around for those stressful 
days) would still be faced with criminal sanction despite not having any 
 161.  People v. Lamborn, 708 N.E.2d 350, 353 (Ill. 1999) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 
747, 759 (1982)).  
 162.  21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 844 (2013). 
 163.  NORML: WORKING TO REFORM MARIJUANA LAWS, http://norml.org/states (last visited 
February 9, 2014) (Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, 
Washington, D.C. all allow medicinal marijuana use in one fashion or another.). 
 164.  Id. (While many states have misdemeanor charges that apply to possession of minor amounts 
of marijuana, Colorado and Washington are the only states to have completely decriminalized the 
personal use of marijuana as of the present day.). 
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intention whatsoever of distributing either the pornographic photos or the 
after-work joints. 
Both the Illinois Supreme Court in Hollins and the Nebraska Supreme 
Court in Senters found that “even if the intimate act is intended to remain 
secret, a danger exists that the recording may finds its way into the public 
sphere, haunting the child participant for the rest of his or her life.”165 The 
Hollins majority also adopted the reasoning of the Senters Court’s state-
ment that while it “is reasonable to conclude that persons 16 or 17 years 
old” may be “old enough to consent to sexual relations” might not fully 
appreciate that “today’s recording of a private, intimate moment may be the 
Internet’s biggest hit next week.”166 Can such an argument be upheld in a 
case like Hollins, where the pictures of A.V. and Mr. Hollins showed only 
their genitals and did not display any identifying marks, like the faces of 
either participant or any scars or tattoos? 
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Senters also found that “[i]f sexually 
explicit conduct is not record, it cannot be distributed” and that “criminaliz-
ing the making of recordings depicting persons under 18 years of age en-
gaged in sexually explicit conduct” is a reasonable way in which to further 
the legislature’s goal.167 The legislature’s goal was protecting the “child” 
from the reputational harm that would occur if the once private recordings 
were later distributed and made public.168
This argument should not be persuasive nor controlling because it 
comes from a flawed logic in which the potential of something occurring 
justifies the punishment of the action that might lead to the unwanted oc-
currence. To analogize, we do not stop Smith & Weston or Glock from 
producing guns simply because the guns that they produce might be used to 
kill people. On the contrary, despite the high likelihood and the frequency 
with which unregistered guns end up in the hands of those who use them to 
commit violent crimes, the producers of those guns are not punished or 
prevented from continuing to produce the guns.169
The mere possibility that the recordings of private consensual acts 
might become public should not justify the criminalization of the record-
 165.  People v. Hollins, 971 N.E.2d 504, 510 (Ill. 2012) (citing State v. Senters, 699 N.W.2d 810, 
817 (Neb. 2005).  
 166.  Id.
 167.  Id.
 168.  Id.
 169.  Ezra Klein, Twelve Facts About Guns and Mass Shootings in the United States, WASH. POST
(Dec.14, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/12/14/nine-facts-about-
guns-and-mass-shootings-in-the-united-states/; Mark Follman, Gavin Aronsen & Deanna Pan, A Guide 
to Mass Shootings in America, MOTHER JONES (July 20, 2012, 6:32 PM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/07/mass-shootings-map.  
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ings, given that there is no similar punishment for the far greater probabil-
ity that guns will – and do – wind up in dangerous hands with much greater 
frequency. I would argue that the recording of consensual acts should be 
treated instead on an individual basis and not criminalized through use of a 
blanket rule that criminalizes all acts, even those that do not lead to mass 
distribution of the private recordings. 
V. A POST-HOLLINS ALTERNATIVE: CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON A CASE-BY-
CASE BASIS
A case-by-case analysis of future cases that resemble Hollins is ap-
propriate considering the grave consequences faced by those found to have 
violated child pornography laws. Those convicted of a sex offense that 
requires registration as a sex offender, whether it be for a finite period of 
time or for life, face not only the stigma that is faced by those who are con-
victed of any felony, but also a host of other issues.170 In Illinois, a sex 
offender has a duty to register in the city or county in which they live.171
He must update the registration every time he moves.172 Additionally, he 
cannot live within 500-feet of a school, park or playground, and must pro-
vide a DNA sample to be placed on file with the Illinois State Police.173
Furthermore, information regarding who is a sex offender is available to 
the public, as part of the Sex Offender Community Notification Law174 and 
the Sheriff of all counties in Illinois except Cook County are required to 
send information about the registered sex offenders residing in the county 
to various agencies, such as schools and playgrounds in the county.175
Having already decided that people in a situation like that of Mr. Hol-
lins should be subject not to rational review but to the mid-level heightened 
scrutiny, this Note further proposes that the prosecution and criminalization 
of people in a situation like Mr. Hollins could alternatively be analyzed 
through a totality of the circumstances approach176 and not be governed by 
a bright-line rule,177 as the Illinois child pornography statute suggests. 
While bright-line rules are essential for police officers in deciding if and 
whether they have authority to act, as in the determination of the proper 
 170.  See generally Elizabeth B. Megale, From Innocent Boys to Dirty Old Men: Why the Sex 
Offender Registry Fails, 47 NO. 6 CRIM. L. BULL. ART. 2 (2011). 
 171.  730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/3 (2013). 
 172.  730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/6 (2013). 
 173.  730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/8 (2013). 
 174.  730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 152/110 (2013). 
 175.  730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 152/120 (2013). 
 176.  See generally Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
 177.  See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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scope of a police officer’s authority to search an arrestee and the area with-
in his immediate control in the search incident to arrest exception to the 
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment178, the impact on a person’s 
life of being convicted of a sex offense and branded a sex offender is too 
great to allow such a mechanical application of the black letter law to gov-
ern these offenses.179
The more appropriate approach would be to consider the circumstanc-
es of the situation, the participants, and the “criminal activity” involved 
through the lens of the totality of the circumstances to determine whether 
criminal sanctions are warranted. If it is decided that criminal sanctions are 
warranted, then the defendant would have the opportunity to use consent as 
an affirmative defense, in the same way that a defendant can use self-
defense in a battery prosecution.180 Therefore, if a subsequent defendant is 
in the same position as Mr. Hollins was with substantially the same circum-
stances (i.e. sex with a partner who meets the minimum age for the appli-
cable age of consent law, no allegations of rape or forced intercourse and 
permission from the partner to photograph their intimate acts), the proper 
scenario would be as follows: 
First, upon his arrest and charging for the creation, possession, and 
distribution of pornography, the burden would shift to the defendant to 
show that under the totality of the circumstances, criminal sanctions are not 
warranted. Such a showing could be made through the testimony of the 
“child” involved, who, like A.V., is seventeen and was legally able to con-
sent to the sexual acts depicted in the photographs or video created. This 
testimony would be allowed only upon the successful examination of such 
a “child” to determine that not only is she capable of understanding the 
potential ramifications of committing her acts to reproducible media but 
also that she freely made the decision to film or photograph her body under 
no coercion by the defendant. The burden upon the defendant would be the 
same as in rape cases where a consent defense is used; the defendant would 
be required to produce some evidence that the “child” is mature enough to 
be capable of understanding her decision to photograph or be photo-
graphed.181 The showing that the “child” was mature enough (meaning 
 178.  See generally Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
 179.  730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150 (2013). 
 180.  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-1 (2013). 
 181.  People v. Haywood, 515 N.E.2d 45, 50 (Ill. 1987) (where consent is a defense to be raised by 
the accused to rebut evidence of force presented by the State in a prosecution for rape; once this the 
defendant has raised the defense and produced some evidence of consent, the burden shifts to the 
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt both that force was used as well as that there was no 
consent).
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mature enough not just to the defendant’s belief but objectively mature 
enough in the court’s eyes) to consent to the photography and understand 
the possible future ramifications would also be similar to the use of reason-
able belief of age in a statutory rape prosecution.182
For someone in a position substantially similar to Mr. Hollins, the evi-
dence could include some of the following: testimony that the sexual part-
ner, while seventeen years old, was in college,183 which shows that the 
sexual partner has attained a certain degree of maturity and that if she can 
be trusted to make decisions about her future education and employment, 
then she can probably also be trusted to make decisions about her sexual 
activities; that the sexual partner knew the defendant in her case, and was 
not in forced into either the sexual activities or the photography.184 It is 
also worth noting that the sexual partner was of the legal age to consent to 
sex, especially in Mr. Hollins situation where A.V. had met him at the age 
of sixteen but it was not until she was seventeen and “legal” that their sex-
ual relationship began.185
Second, upon this showing, the burden would once more shift, this 
time to the applicable prosecuting office to show, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the criminal sanctions are still warranted despite the showing 
made by the defendant. The defendant’s failure to make the showing could 
be used to help establish this burden. This burden would also apply to the 
prosecutor to show that the sexual partner, as discussed above, was not 
mature enough to make her own decisions regarding being photographed in 
a sexually explicit manner or that she was not mature enough to make the 
decision and understand the possible ramifications of creating a record of 
her activities. 
It is important to note that this burden shifting, totality of the circum-
stances approach would not apply to child pornography that is specifically 
produced with the purpose of it being distributed and sold for profit. This 
approach would only apply to those recordings that are created only for 
 182.  People v. Lemons, 593 N.E.2d 1040, 1044 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that if the issue of the 
defendant’s reasonable belief of the victim’s age is raised, the prosecution has the burden of providing 
that the defendant did not reasonably believe that the “child” was of the age of consent beyond a rea-
sonable doubt); see also People v. Brown, 525 N.E.2d 576, 580 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that, as an 
affirmative defense, the defense of reasonable belief of age to a charge of statutory rape operates in the 
same manner as other affirmative defenses and that the defendant must raise the issue and present some 
evidence if the prosecution’s own evidence does not do so). 
 183.  People v. Hollins, 971 N.E.2d 504, 507 (Ill. 2012) (A.V. was a student at Highland College, 
as was Mr. Hollins.).  
 184.  Id. A.V. had met Mr. Hollins at her home when she was 16 and there were never any allega-
tions that Mr. Hollins either took the photographs of the two of them surreptitiously or without A.V.’s 
consent and against her wishes. Id. 
 185.  Id.
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personal use and enjoyment. Criminal penalties could later be imposed 
upon anyone who moves the recordings into the stream of commerce 
through distribution and sale, whether the person who does so was one of 
the two parties or a later third party. This provision would represent the 
government’s important government interest in protecting children and 
preventing depictions of child pornography from being commercially pro-
duced, distributed and sold within and throughout the United States. 
An additional alternative would involve changing the child pornogra-
phy statute. The first step in the process would be amending the child por-
nography statutes to reflect the age of consent in a state for participation in 
sexual activity.186 In such a case, Mr. Hollins would not be subject to crim-
inal sanctions because A.V. would be legally allowed to consent to both 
sex and being photographed. Such an alternative is unlikely to pass muster 
in the state or federal governments because, as discussed above, setting the 
federal age limit for consent for pornography purposes at eighteen was 
done in order to make determinations as to who constitutes a minor more 
easily discernible. Lowering this age to reflect the age of consent for sexual 
relations in each individual state would be counteract the motivation and 
purpose behind having a uniform federal standard for what constitutes a 
minor. The burden shifting approach that I have laid out about is more like-
ly to be palatable because it creates the rebuttable presumption that anyone 
under the age of eighteen is unable to consent to sexually explicit photog-
raphy. It is only by using a case-by-case analysis of the criminal offenses 
faced by people like Mr. Hollins that the presumption can be rebutted. Such 
a situation would continue to protect children as legislatures have intended 
while also forgoing punishment for someone like Mr. Hollins, who creates 
pornography in the context of a legal, consensual relationship with a part-
ner who—while technically a minor—has demonstrated that she is mature 
enough to understand the future consequences of her actions. 
CONCLUSION
Preventing the creation and distribution of child pornography is and 
should remain an important and compelling governmental interest. Howev-
er, there are enormous penalties, both criminal and social, that accompany 
the stigma of being punished for a sex offense. Therefore, the prosecution 
of those who are found to have created child pornography for purely per-
sonal use involving a “child” who is legally able to consent to the sexual 
 186.  In Illinois, this would mean defining a minor for the purposes of the child pornography stat-
utes to include only those below the age of seventeen, which is the age at which a person can legally 
consent to sexual activity. 
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relations captured on media and who is also shown to be mature enough to 
have made such a decision should not be adjudicated in the same way as 
those who create child pornography with a child unable to legally consent 
to the sexual relations involved; nor should such cases be treated the same 
as those situations in which the pornography is created for commercial 
distribution. 
While the right to record one’s sexual acts is not a fundamental act, 
the Supreme Court has firmly established that there is a fundamental right 
to privacy inherent in consensual sexual relations between consenting 
adults187 and this fundamental right should influence the possibility that 
one of the parties may be punished for the recording of their exercising of 
this fundamental right. Considering the immense consequences and the 
stigma that attach to one convicted of a sex offense, especially a sex of-
fense involving a “child”, such prosecutions should not be undertaken 
lightly when the “child” involved is of a certain age such as to be able to 
legally consent to sex but not able to consent to the recording of the con-
sensual sex. Such an approach would also allow courts to avoid the Consti-
tutional question of deciding what level of scrutiny would apply to such 
cases188, by providing an alternative method under which certain instances 
of “child” pornography would be analyzed and decided on a basis con-
sistent with the affirmative defenses already recognized by courts nation-
wide.
 187.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 188.  Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (“The Court will not 
pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present 
some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”).  
